pk10投注技巧 1919年12月8日，麦克米伦出版社(Macmillan Press)出版了一本书，作者是一位相对无名的英国财政部官员，为抗议结束了第一次世界大战划时代创伤的《凡尔赛和约》，他别去了政府职务。
On Dec. 8, 1919, Macmillan Press published a book by a relatively unknown British Treasury official who resigned his government post in protest at the treaty of Versailles, which ended the landmark trauma of world war I.
The modest treatise, the official wrote, was an attempt to explain "his objections to the treaty, or to the entire policy of Paris and the council on European economic issues." The publisher was cautious, first printing just 5, 000 copies, which seemed appropriate for a technocrat's dissenting opinion, with passages detailing the history and prospects of things like German coal production and export markets.
结果,《〈凡尔赛和约〉的经济后果》(The Economic Consequences of the Peace)获得了巨大成功。很快就印刷了六次,并翻译成十几种语言,销量超过了10万册,这也让书的作者、36岁的约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯(John Maynard Keynes)举世著名。
As a result, "The Economic Consequences of The Peace of Versailles" was a huge success. It was quickly printed six times, translated into a dozen languages and sold more than 100,000 copies, making its author, John Maynard Keynes, 36, world-famous.
Brilliant and tireless, Keynes was a scholar as well as a public intellectual, journalist, government adviser and defender of the arts. For the rest of his fame, Keynes was at the centre of many things. The Keynesian revolution reshaped economics in the 1930s and continues to shape the field today. Keynes, once again a representative of the British Treasury during the second world war, was a leading intellectual in the construction of the post-war international order. But his career began with dissent.
Keynes's book is basically right on its most important points. But the book was, and still is, largely misunderstood.
pk10投注技巧 《经济后果》一书的笔法很壮观——凯恩斯与布卢姆斯伯里派关系密切，那是一群打破传统的艺术家和作家。他对和平缔造者(乔治·克列孟梭[Georges Clemenceau]、戴维·劳合·乔治[David Lloyd George]和伍德罗·威尔逊[Woodrow Wilson])入木三分的、坦率的刻画，反映了里顿·斯特拉奇(Lytton Strachey)不久前广受关注的《维多利亚时代四名人传》(Eminent Victorians)一书不加约束写法的影响。该书也因评估德国支付战争赔款的能力而广受争议。
Economic consequences is a magnificent book - Keynes was closely associated with bloomsbury, a group of iconoclastic artists and writers. His penetrating, frank portrayal of the peacemakers (Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson) reflects the unbribed influence of Lytton Strachey's recently acclaimed "Victorians. The book is also controversial for assessing Germany's ability to pay war reparations.
Keynes's book is basically right on its most important points. But the book was, and still is, largely misunderstood. The book's enduring contribution lies not in Keynes's first objection (his "objection to the treaty") but in his second objection, which is to the policy of "the European economic problem". Keynes was warning of the fragility of the European order.
Keynes argued that while many europeans were celebrating a new era in the continent's economy, too much of what emerged after the war was based on long-established, underappreciated, carefully woven networks and foundations. "The instability that existed when the war broke out," he wrote, had been destroyed by years of total war, but had not been replaced by something more stable after the war. Restoring broad economic order, not short-sighted retaliation, was the order of the day. This, he argues, was a major failure of the "treaty" -- not just the treaty of Versailles itself, but the entire political and economic framework for concluding it.
So while economists and historians - then and since - focus on questions such as whether Keynes underestimated Germany's ability to pay war reparations, they miss the bigger question. It is possible that Keynes was surely wrong. But he is absolutely right about the crisis facing Europe and what the treaty does not cover.
凯恩斯认识来，这场战争已经“严复动摇了这个体系，以至于整个危及来欧洲的生存”。但是，条约“没有包括复兴欧洲经济的任何措施——没有任何东西使战败的中欧帝国成为好邻国，没有任何东西让欧洲的新国家稳固下来”，没有任何东西来复原“法国和意大利纷乱的财政”。他认为，迫使德国陷入本质上的奴役状态，“将播下欧洲整个文明生活走向衰落的种子”。 纽约时报中英文网 http://www.2zhicat.com
pk10投注技巧 Keynes realised that the war had "shaken the system so much that it threatened the very existence of Europe". But the treaty "contains nothing to revive the European economy -- nothing to make the defeated central European empires good neighbors, nothing to stabilize the new states of Europe" and nothing to restore "the fiscal mess of France and Italy." Forcing Germany into a state of virtual servitude, he argued, "would sow the seeds of the decline of the whole civilised life of Europe".
Keynes was well prepared to grasp the magnitude of the most dangerous macroeconomic mess. During the war, his job at the British Treasury was to raise money to keep the war going. He was the official representative of the British Treasury at the Paris peace conference; Moreover, as the duties of Austen Chamberlain, the chancellor of the exchequer, required him to remain in Britain, Keynes was appointed as his deputy to the supreme economic council.
Arriving in Paris on January 10, 1919, he soon fell into a whirlpool。 Sent to a meeting with German financiers, the young finance ministry official negotiated the terms of an emergency food shipment to Germany, which was on the verge of mass starvation。
凯恩斯后来在他最好的长篇散文之一《梅尔基奥博士：一个被击败的敌人》(Dr. Melchior: A Defeated Enemy)中描述了这些事件，他分两次在剑桥自传俱乐部和布卢姆斯伯里派密友的会上私下宣读了这篇散文。弗吉尼亚·伍尔夫(Virginia Woolf)从第二次聚会回家后，写了热情充满的笔记，对其文学价值大加颂扬。这是凯恩斯要求死后方可出版的两篇杰作之一(另一篇是《我的早期信仰》[My Early Beliefs])。
Keynes later described these events in one of his best long essays, "Dr。 Melchior: A Defeated Enemy," which he read privately at two meetings of Cambridge autobiography club and bloomsbury cronies。 Virginia Woolf, coming home from her second party, wrote glowing notes extolling her literary merits。 It was one of two masterpieces Keynes requested to be published only after his death (the other was "My Early Beliefs")。
His Settings have a cinematic feel:
With some behind-the-scenes improvisation, aided by inspiration, Keynes pulled off these modest, introductory negotiations. The wider peace process, however, was a disaster, and Keynes saw it all up close.
As the historian Eric Weitz describes it, German delegates were "incredulous" about the terms before them; When the details were made public in Germany, the reaction was shock and anger。 The two sides killed each other in the war and were locked in a stalemate until the later intervention of the distant United States decisively tipped the balance of power。 Germany, which had not been occupied by foreign armies and had expected to win a share of the losers in the peace deal, was not prepared to accept what amounted to an unconditional surrender: the expropriation of colonies, the loss of territory, the sinking of the navy, the dissolution of the army and the imposition of reparations。
As Keynes wrote in "economic consequences", and stressed many times after its publication, his concern was "not the justice of the treaty" but "the wisdom of the treaty and its consequences". He worked behind the scenes for a more far-sighted plan.
He had in April 1919, a time of a flash, saw his hope of "grand plan" may be adopted: not so many reparations (British share transfer to the German invasion of other victims), cancel all war between the entente countries debt (the United States will be the first to bear the burden), setting up a European free trade area (to avoid a variety of new countries in eastern Europe split could lead to chaos in international trade), and a new international loans, let of continental Europe in the period of economic imbalances difficult recovery.
pk10投注技巧 The plan borders on political naivete: the americans will not give up their money easily, and the French will not give up their revenge easily。 In the 1918 election, British politicians famously (albeit foolishly) promised to hold Germany accountable for the full costs of the war, with one promising to squeeze Germany "until it's dry"。
But for Keynes, the stakes were so great that they had to be worked for. Historians focused on his lighter reparations proposal, but he was more troubled by the problem of the Allies' debts. These debts "threaten the financial stability of all countries", impose a "devastating burden" on them and will be a "constant source of international friction", he wrote in an internal Treasury briefing. An international financial order that is little more than a debt and reparations mess will not "last a day".
On May 14, 1919, he wrote a harrowing letter to his mother telling her of his plans to resign, but he persisted for more than three weeks despite being "very tired of what had happened." On June 5th he handed in his resignation to Lloyd George, Britain's prime minister, and went home to regroup, soon to devote his passion to writing "economic consequences".
Keynes's book was accompanied by an intellectual campaign that, despite its great success, had little impact on the foreign policy of the great powers concerned。 In his essay for us readers in Everybody's Monthly, he repeated the point made on the first page of his book: "Germany bears a special and unusual responsibility for the universality and destructive character of the war。" But the treaty of Versailles had "made Europe more unstable than it was before the treaty", and interests, not revenge, must guide policy。 "It would be a disaster for the world if America isolated itself," he added。
In the book's French preface, he asks, "will France be safe with her sentinels on the Rhine?" However, "blood, pain and fanaticism are common from the Rhine eastward across both continents."
Few people heard these words. American enthusiasm for Wilson's internationalism soon gave way to a resurgence of nationalism and nativism. The United States has prioritized domestic demands over global concerns, and Europe's economic woes have been exacerbated by its intransigent and short-sighted hardline stance on war debt.
France sought to enforce it strictly by the letter of the treaty, even occupying the ruhr valley in January 1923 in response to Germany's failure to meet its reparation obligations. The occupation, which lasted two and a half years and was met with passive resistance and hyperinflation, seemed to prove Keynes's point.
The equilibrium of the 1920s has been painfully maintained, and occasional glimmers of progress and co-operation have done little to overcome the big problems that Keynes recognised from the start: fragile finances and underlying political angst。 A powerful push would have disequilibrated, as it did in the 1931 global financial crisis, exacerbated by France's quest for political advantage as Austrian and German Banks tottered。
As Keynes put it at the time, "the painful German crisis of 1931, which was essentially a banking crisis but was unquestionably triggered by political events and political fears, surprised the world as much as it should have."
These political problems mean the crisis is not under control。 The crisis spiraled out of control, sending the world economy into the depths of the great depression and leading directly to the rise of fascism in Germany and Japan。
凯恩斯在《〈凡尔赛和约〉的经济后果》一书中警告,“人们不总会毫不挣扎地死去”,而“他们在痛苦中可能颠覆机构的残余部分,并湮灭文明本身”。一代人后,美国外交家乔治·F·凯南(George F。 Kennan)会提出理由说,20世纪30年代外交政策悲惨结局可以追溯来20世纪20年代“失去的机会”。凯恩斯肯定会同意这一点。
Keynes, in his book the economic consequences of the treaty of Versailles and >, warned that "people do not always die without struggle" and that "in their agony they may subdue the remnants of institutions and annihilate civilization itself". A generation later, the American diplomat George f. Kennan would make the case that the tragic end of foreign policy in the 1930s could be traced back to the "lost opportunities" of the 1920s. Keynes would certainly have agreed.